Solution
The correct answer is option 1. The passage's moral hazard and incentive argument, presented in the second argument of the first paragraph, states that "paying compensations without taking into account the economic performance achieved by individual agents will fail to elicit optimum effort." The logic is that linking pay to observable performance elicits greater effort, thereby contributing to growth. Option 1, which ties pay rewards to verifiable performance for highly productive workers, directly mirrors this mechanism: compensation is contingent on measurable output, creating the inequality-driven incentive the passage describes.
Option 2 is wrong (reversed). Determining wages by tenure rather than output is precisely the kind of compensation structure the moral hazard argument warns against. The passage says that ignoring individual economic performance in pay decisions fails to elicit optimum effort, so tenure-based pay contradicts rather than supports the incentive claim.
Option 3 is wrong (keyword trap). Concentrating stock ownership in corporate governance is indeed discussed in the passage, but it belongs to the third argument about corporate governance and free-rider problems, not to the moral hazard and incentive argument. The question specifically asks about the incentive argument, so this option attaches a valid passage concept to the wrong reasoning strand.
Option 4 is wrong (out of scope). Rents protected by market power that enlarge top incomes without linking pay to results introduce a scenario the passage never endorses. The moral hazard argument requires a connection between compensation and performance; option 4 explicitly severs that link, making it incompatible with the claim that performance-based inequality raises growth.